To
print this page, select "Print" from the File menu of your browser
Australian
Broadcasting Corporation
FOUR CORNERS
Investigative
journalism at its very best
TV
PROGRAM TRANSCRIPT
LOCATION: abc.net.au > Four Corners > Archives
URL: http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s39706.htm
Broadcast:
12/07/99
Blood on the Cross
Mark
Davis investigates allegations about the role of the International Red Cross
and the British military in a massacre in the Southern Highlands of west papua
in May 1996. The story of what happened has never been told before.
---------
Reporter: Mark Davis
Producer: Mark Davis, Peter Cronau
Research: Matt Brown, Peter Cronau
Mark Davis: This whole place [Jayapura] is full of Indonesian soldiers
and spies and they're not just here to terrorise the locals - they're here to
keep information in and foreigners out. I had to leave here 12 months ago when
I was being followed day and night. I've returned to complete the story that I
began then. It's a story of a massacre, a story that involves not just
Indonesians, but Western governments and the International Red Cross, with
white soldiers literally carrying out acts of murder.
Map: West Papua (Irian
Jaya) showing the locations of Jayapura, Timika and the Southern Highlands.
Mark Davis: The
Southern Highlands of West Papua or Irian Jaya, one of the planet's last secret
places. Neither priest nor profiteer had set foot in these valleys until the
1960s. It's likely that they still contain people and places totally unknown to
the outside world. May last year - reports of starvation have been filtering
out of the Highlands. The International Committee for the Red Cross together
with the Australian army re dropping food. It's a drought relief program they
both claim, "death by El Nino" - but on the ground the hungry and the
dying have a different story. As the Australian army and the International Red
Cross deliver their payload across the Highlands, a 16-year-old boy has made an
epic journey down from the mountain to the capital, Jayapura. Today he has seen
his first electric light, his first car and his first glimpse of the ocean.
Until a few months ago he'd never seen an Indonesian soldier, and the first one
that he did see tried to kill him.
Papuan Boy: So I ran
away into the river and I saw the bullets hit the water. They went zing zing
and then I passed out.
Mark Davis: This boy
and the pastor who found him speak of what is really happening in the
Highlands. It's not El Nino which is killing people and destroying crops, it's
the Indonesian army: dozens have been killed and tortured, food gardens
destroyed, villages burnt to the ground. Entire communities have fled into the
jungle and are slowly starving to death. I was forced to abandon my plan to
travel into the military zone, but I was able to send my camera in. After some
basic lessons I left, and a few months later an extraordinary video arrived in
the mail. These are the first images ever broadcast of some of the people that
are being hunted across the mountains by the Indonesian military, and the first
video of independence leader Kelly Kwalik. For 20 years Kwalik has moved
through these forests preaching war against Indonesia and the giant Freeport
gold mine which had come onto his land. He is probably the most famous man in
West Papua, but only one distant image of him had ever been published. Rarely
sighted, often rumoured to be dead - to many almost a mythical figure.
Kelly Kwalik: Freeport
and the Indonesian government regard me as a criminal or a cruel person. This
is an absolute lie. The truth is I am a true patriot fighting for my country of
West Papua. I regard Freeport and the government and military of Indonesia as
criminals, thieves, oppressors, rapists, destroyers of all life and violators
of all laws.
Mark Davis: Kwalik
spoke of a campaign to exterminate his people, a campaign that had began in
earnest three years ago with an act of murder by white soldiers - western
murderers aided, he believes, by the world's most respected humanitarian
organisation.
Kelly Kwalik: The
International Red Cross has been used by the military or the Indonesian government.
Papuans (shouting): Freedom!
Freedom!
Mark Davis: This was
the first message he had been able to get out to the world and there was a ring
of truth about it. I made arrangements to go back.
Papuans (singing): Oh
Mother, I'm going to die. We are going to die. We are going to die.
Mark Davis: Getting
to see Kwalik and his followers is a story in itself which can't be told. There
are several thousand Indonesian troops now stationed in these hills hunting for
Kwalik and protecting the Freeport mine. All of the main villages around here
are now military hamlets, but there are still about 1,000 people who refuse to
come in. They call themselves "the outsiders": The Amungme, the Nduga
and the Dani - the three main tribes of the Southern Highlands. These people
are a mixture of veteran fighters from the Free West Papua Movement, the OPM,
and more recent refugees fleeing the Indonesian military and too scared to
return to their villages. This camp is their last refuge in the mountains, and
their leader is Kelly Kwalik.
Kelly Kwalik: They
chased them far into the jungles. It was difficult to get medicines, difficult
to get food. So they died because of the illness, starvation and of course
being gunned down. So, when Indonesia said they died from drought it was
totally a lie. It was a lie. It was said to justify the Indonesian government's
wrong-doing.
Mark Davis: The
people here estimate that 120 tribespeople have been killed and even more died
of starvation and disease as the Indonesian Army swept across the mountains in
pursuit of these three men - Kelly Kwalik, Daniel Kogoya and Silas Kogoya -
each of whom have been hunted for more than 20 years.
Papuans (singing): Be
careful or the Javanese will bomb you. Hit by the atom bomb and we die.
Mark Davis: In 1977
most of these people had their first introduction to the modern world courtesy
of the Indonesian airforce.
Daniel Kogoya: This one
was born in the jungle. After the events of that year they ran away and lived
in the jungle.
Mark Davis: Just
eight years after the United Nations had handed West Papua over to the
Indonesians there was a series of independence flag raisings in the main towns
of the Highlands. The Indonesian response was staggering - they bombed and
strafed villages whose loyalties they regarded as suspect.
Daniel Kogoya: Since
they were breast feeding until now they've never seen a town.
Mark Davis: At least
1,000 people were killed, perhaps as many as 5,000. Others fled into the forest
never to return, not even to visit any government controlled area again.
Daniel Kogoya: All the
people of their age have the same story.
Mark Davis: During
the bombings in '77, Kwalik joined with Daniel and Silas and attacked
Indonesia's single most valuable asset - the Freeport gold and copper mine -
shutting it down for a week. It was a strike at Indonesia's economic foundation
and since then these people have faced a state of continuous war and the world
has barely heard about it. Freeport - the biggest gold and copper mine in the
world, American owned with the backing of British-Australian mining giant, Rio
Tinto. In 1994, 20 civilians were killed or disappeared at the hands of
Indonesian troops in and around the mine, and dozens of others were raped and
tortured after an independence flag was raised there. The killings continued
through the next year. In Kwalik's mind the armies of the world would come to
his people's aid if they knew what was happening - if only he had the means of
getting his message out. This was the setting when a team of biologists came
onto Nduga land in search of uncharted valleys. Kelly, Silas and Daniel had
found their outlet to the world.
Silas Kogoya (singing):
When the English people came. Remember when. Remember when.
Mark Davis: Together
with their guides, four Indonesians researchers were kidnapped, four British
students, a German and a Dutch couple, Mark and Martha Klein. Martha was three
months' pregnant.
Daniel Kogoya: Amongst
the hostages one woman was a bit rude. They wanted to be released very soon.
Silas Kogoya:
"Don't let me give birth here." That's what Martha said. She even
asked me to kill a pig and cook it for her.
Kelly Kwalik: We took
the researchers as hostage because we had no other way for our cause to be
acknowledged.
Mark Davis: Daniel
Start was the leader of the British team.
Daniel Start: It was
clear they didn't really know what they wanted to do with us, but it was quite
soon after that that we realised that we were something very significant to
them.
Mark Davis:
Indonesia's special forces KOPASSUS were charged with securing the hostages'
release. The troops were led by Major-General Probowo, with a team of expert
advisers from Holland and particularly Britain.
Ivor Helberg: These
tribespeople, their minds wander and you know, total agreement even in a
democracy is difficult enough, but you can imagine with these tribal people
they could never come to any real conclusion as to what needed to be done.
Mark Davis: The
British appointed Military Attache and SAS veteran Colonel Ivor Helberg to
provide specialised assistance and advice to Probowo.
Ivor Helberg: Simply
they were illiterate. You're talking about people who are really in the stone
age - very small, very muscular, very emotive. And we obviously had to treat
this situation extremely carefully because these people were perfectly capable
of killing.
Daniel Kogoya: But I
could not do that. I'd always returned hostages, even soldiers. I caught them,
fed them, looked after them and took them back.
Mark Davis: For four
months the Red Cross and others negotiated with Kwalik. Until today the details
of those negotiations and the military attack that led to the hostages' release
have been murky. The official story goes that eight OPM soldiers were killed in
a battle with KOPASSUS, who rescued the hostages. A battle that reached its
climax after two of the Indonesian captives had been executed by the OPM. It is
a story that the International Red Cross and the British and Dutch officials
who worked with Probowo have never publicly cast doubt upon. A story that
seemed to justify Probowo's next mission - a military operation to track down
the OPM murderers.
Daniel Kogoya: He [Kelly
Kwalik] says that he has read it in the magazine and the whole world believes
that the hostages were murdered by OPM. But we've got witnesses. Right.
Silas Kogoya: And also
the British hostages were there, the Dutch were also present, weren't they
right in front of them?
Mark Davis: Daniel
Start confirms that the Indonesians were not killed by their OPM captors. The
witnesses here reveal they were killed by grieving civilians - friends and
relatives of the innocent people who had been murdered days before under
extraordinary circumstances - lured to their deaths by a white helicopter with
a Red Cross flag and gunned down by four or five white people and the
Indonesians hiding behind them.
Daniel Kogoya: At first
it was Western people, white people. The pilot, and the helicopter were
Freeport. I came towards the front and the soldiers came down the other side.
They lay down an the shooting started immediately.
Mark Davis: These are
the first eye witness accounts of what occurred in the village of Geselema on
the 9th of May, 1996, but it's not just Kwalik's people who testify to it. This
month the Institute for Human Rights in Irian Jaya is about to release its
account of what occurred in Geselema and they have given me permission to talk
with one of their investigators. This man was one of a team who over the past
12 months got behind the military blockade and spoke directly with civilian eye
witnesses.
Institute for Human Rights Investigator:
The people were surprised because the Red Cross used to help them, but now they
are killing the people.
Mark Davis: The
statements all confirm a white helicopter with Indonesian soldiers hiding in
the back, a Red Cross flag, white people shooting at them and, many of them
claim, a white woman whom they'd learnt to trust, Sylvianne Bonadei of the
International Committee for the Red Cross. Sylvianne Bonadei has now left the
ICRC and for the first time she speaks publicly about the accusation.
Sylvianne Bonadei: Of course
it has affected me very much. I think in my own personality first of all, and
then I had all that distress of being accused and not being able, you know, to
let those people know that, "No, I wasn't in that plane."
Mark Davis: Sylvianne
believes that the people of Geselema are telling the truth, but that a white
soldier impersonated her in the attack.
Sylvianne Bonadei: Of course
when you look back and you think military strategies and you think, "OK,
how could have it been happening?" of course you can understand that yeah,
that was an easy way to get back in there, because the local population could recognise
our chopper from far away and every time we were landing everybody was around.
I mean it was even sometimes dangerous for the pilot to land because there
would be people everywhere.
Q: They trusted you?
A: They, yeah, they trusted us very
much.
Mark Davis: But were
there any white soldiers present in West Papua at the time? Not according to
the official account, but the official account has hidden the truth for three
years.
Daniel Start:
Q: Did you ever ask whether it was the
British who were on board the helicopter?
A: No, I don't, we didn't. There
wasn't really any need to.
Q: Did you assume it was them?
A: We assumed they'd been involved.
Q: And what was that assumption based
upon?
A: It was based on this, on what
reliable people had told us about white helicopters and white people, and
particularly on what the KOPASSUS troops told us when we were rescued.
Q: What did they say?
A: Just simply that the, there were
British troops around, or British people around, or actually white people
around.
Q: Around?
A: They said, "Some of your guys
around here."
Ivor Helberg: This is a
picture of myself and General Probowo. He worked on advice from people like
myself, and this was you know, on a, not just on a daily basis, I mean we were
virtually living cheek by jowl, as you can imagine, the whole time.
Mark Davis: The
British have acknowledged that Ivor Helberg had a team of police hostage
experts working with him, but it now appears that he had far more men at his
disposal.
Ivor Helberg: You
should understand that obviously, I must be careful because obviously I'm, I've
been a service person.
Q: Yeah?
A: And people that I've operated with,
I'm, you know?
Q: Yeah?
A: They're people who, you know, I
must make absolutely sure they don't in any way, you know, they're not put in
jeopardy or anything of that sort. I don't think you understand that.
Mark Davis: Witnesses
claim that Ivor Helberg had a team of British SAS operatives working with him
in the final weeks of the operation. It is a claim he does not deny. It is also
claimed that the British provided sophisticated surveillance equipment,
including this pilotless drone or UAV, to the operation. This and other technology
requires specialised military operators and it appears that the British engaged
a team of subcontractors to work under Helberg. It's still unclear exactly who
those military subcontractors were.
Ivor Helberg: Of course
we use UAVs and all sorts of things, those stories are perfectly true and in
any situation you want to use every single bit of advice, every single bit of
kit you, and it's very difficult to, it's very easy shall we say to confuse,
you know, actually what is advice and, "Oh my goodness, they're deeply
involved you know - Executive Action, DSL, you know, Sandline, all these
people."
Mark Davis: Colonel
Helberg is referring to groups of mercenaries.
Executive Outcomes Promotional Video:
Hi, I'm Gavin and I work for Executive Outcomes and I've been working for them
for a long time now.
Mark Davis: One of
these groups is Executive Outcomes seen here at work in Africa, were discovered
in Papua New Guinea in 1997 about to launch a military attack on a group of
landowners who had occupied Rio Tinto's Bougainville mine. But it wasn't the
South Africans' first visit to the region.
File footage of Nick Van Den Berg:
Executive Outcomes can offer probably a military solution.
Mark Davis: For the
first time former chief of Executive Outcomes, Nick Van Den Berg has confirmed
that he led a team of five mercenaries in West Papua during the hostage crisis,
providing advice and training for a helicopter assault team. He denies that he
or his men flew on the helicopter that attacked Geselema. Van Den Berg also
confirms that British SAS were in the area and he can identify two of them by
name. The presence of EO and the SAS has been kept secret for the past three
years, and according to Van Den Berg, there's even more white soldiers floating
about the scene. It's a story that Helberg also confirms.
Ivor Helberg: We had
advisers, and you would expect that. Advisers not only on you know, special
operational procedures, but also on equipment that we might use and you know,
we had to be open to this. And we also had a whole lot of people, as you can
imagine a situation like that had been going on and on and on, we had a lot of
people there who were offering their advice - for good money as you can imagine
- mercenaries and others who came in from all kinds of things.
Q: And they turn up in Irian Jaya -
A: Oh, yes.
Q: - offering their services?
A: Oh, yes. Oh, there was no shortage
of that, but there is in my view anyway, and I cannot imagine that either the
Indonesian government or Her Majesty's government as far as our hostages, would
allow some third party, mercenary organisation, to actually execute the kind of
operation on our behalf. I mean, can you imagine if it all went wrong? It would
be horrendous, wouldn't it? What would the parents think and that sort of
thing?
Mark Davis: For the
Papuans the military operation did go horrendously wrong, but their version has
never been believed and almost a photographic standard of proof has been
required of them. In an Indonesian archive we found these images. This footage
was shot inside Keneyam, General Probowo's military base in West Papua. It was
filmed in the week of the attack upon Geselema. It records the Indonesian
KOPASSUS unit who conducted the attack - and it reveals a white soldier, or
perhaps he is just one of the numerous trainers and advisers that we now know
were there. A white adviser who wears the full battle uniform of a KOPASSUS
soldier. A white adviser who carries a sub-machine gun.
Silas Kogoya (singing): In
the village of Geselema, what happened, what happened?
Mark Davis: The
village of Geselema, May 8, 1996. The ICRC has invited people from across the
Highlands to a large feast to celebrate International Red Cross Day and the
release of the hostages. Within 24 hours some of these villagers will be dead.
The three main members of the ICRC team are present: Doctor Ference Mayer,
responsible for the health of the hostages; Sylvianne Bonadei, fluent in
Bahasa, she has become the most important member of the team; and the head of
the Indonesian office, Henri Fournier.
Henri Fournier: I still
remember that everything was so well and fine, the sun was there. Nothing could
have allow us to think that it would not be a happy ending, and I still today
I'm, don't understand why Mr. Kwalik change his mind during the speech.
Mark Davis: What went
wrong on the 8th is central to what occurred the following day, but it too has
been shrouded in mystery. The ICRC have a video recording of the 8th and other
earlier events which they refuse to release. Four Corners has now obtained a
copy of the tape. It would seem that this video was not shot as a Red Cross
home movie - Kwalik claims he was told it was to ensure that his messages would
reach the outside world.
Kelly Kwalik (in ICRC video of May 8th):
There has been so many tortures, rapes, intimidation and kidnappings, they
cannot be counted.
Mark Davis: Kwalik
knew from radio reports that none of his statements were ever released. By the
8th of May Kwalik had become suspicious that the International Red Cross were
as intent upon muzzling him as the Indonesians were.
Kelly Kwalik (in ICRC video of May 8th):
If people had any understanding of what has happened to us they would have to
feel sorry for us.
Ivor Helberg:
Unfortunately although everything was put into motion, Kelly Kwalik made a
speech, at the very last moment he said, "We'll have no dealings with,
we're going to go into the forest and these people will die."
Mark Davis: Helberg
wasn't there on the 8th. His version of what Kwalik said is not correct, but
whatever impressions he was given would clearly have influenced decisions he
made or advice he gave on the evening of the 8th. This video confirms eye
witness accounts that Kwalik made no threats whatsoever to the lives of the
hostages, but he was angry.
Kelly Kwalik (in ICRC video of May 8th):
Even though we wear penis gourds and torn shirts, we have the brains God gave
to us all.
Mark Davis: Kwalik
had agreed to hand the hostages over to the British and Dutch officials so he
could talk to them directly, but the emissaries that arrived from those
countries came from the Red Cross not the government. He doubted that they
would release his messages either. Were they just part of an elaborate Red
Cross pantomime like the staff who were posing as news cameramen?
Kelly Kwalik (in ICRC video of May 8th):
Is this really the Red Cross or people disguised as the Red Cross?
Mark Davis: Kwalik
suspected that the Indonesians would attack as soon as he handed over the
hostages. He and his people would be killed and still their message would not
have gotten out. He announced that the hostages would not yet be released, but
did not close off negotiations. It was agreed that the ICRC team would return
the next day, but the failure of the 8th had been a bitter and humiliating blow
for them. Witnesses state that Henri Fournier was in a rage when he left the
mountain and flew down to report to General Probowo and the Dutch and British
representatives in Timika.
Ivor Helberg: This is
something you need to talk to Henri about. He felt that he had been betrayed by
in this case the OPM, by Kelly Kwalik. He felt that there was nothing else that
he could do usefully, so he decided that you know, he'd done what he could, he
was terribly sad, as we were, and it really, we realised that we were actually
into a military operation.
Mark Davis: As
Helberg and Probowo considered their options for a military operation they
faced a unique foe.
Ivor Helberg: Of course
they would know if somebody was in the area because they watch the birds and
the reaction of the wildlife.
Mark Davis: The
terrain around Geselema is so extreme that helicopters were the only practical
option, but tactically they had problems as well.
Sylvianne Bonadei: They can
even recognise the noises before the helicopter is in their view. They can say
which ones are the choppers that we were using and the one that the army were
using.
Mark Davis: So how
does Probowo plan on getting helicopters close enough to Kwalik to eliminate
his fighters and pluck out the hostages?
Map: Flight paths between
Timika, Geselema and Keneyam at 7.00am.
Mark Davis: 7.00am on
the morning of the 9th - Sylvianne Bonadei and Dr. Mayer leave Timika and fly
to Geselema as arranged the day before. The doctor's task is to check on the
health of the hostages. Sylvianne's responsibility is to talk with the OPM
leaders. Meanwhile Henri Fournier flies to Keneyam military base and waits with
General Probowo. Fournier claims that at 11.30 after speaking with Sylvianne
and Mayer he officially advises Probowo that the mission of the International
Red Cross has finished.
Henri Fournier: My
conclusion is that while I was, we were involved the terms of, the principle of
the ICRC movement was well respected. As of the 9th of May at around 11.30 in
the morning local time there we were no more involved and I made it known to
everybody.
Mark Davis: The ICRC
point to this press release issued in Geneva as evidence that they gave broad
notice of their withdrawal at approximately 11.30. But they now admit that this
release wasn't issued until after 3.00 o'clock - after the first shots were
fired in Geselema - and of course the people there had no means of receiving it
anyway.
Silas Kogoya (singing):
The place of the boss of the Red Cross. What's it like? What's it like?
Mark Davis: Both
Henri Fournier and his boss Jean Michel Monod still claim that notice was given
- notice given by Sylvianne when she went to Geselema in the morning to take
what they claim was a final offer: "Release the hostages now or the ICRC
would withdraw immediately."
Jean Michel Monod: You know
we came back from this meeting on the morning of the 9th and we did not, we brought
the answer back. The answer was, "No."
Mark Davis: So the
OPM effectively received notice when they rejected the offer and ended the
negotiations - or did they?
Sylvianne Bonadei:
Q: So that was, it was clear that the
negotiations hadn't ended, that you were going to come back?
A: Oh, yeah, nothing had ended, even
Kelly had never said, "It's finished." Never, ever he mention that.
Q: And you'd never said it's finished?
A: No.
Q: You never took the message that,
"This is the last -
A: No.
Q: - chance and if you don't do it now
we're pulling out"?
A: No.
Q: So they didn't know that the ICRC
was leaving, basically, at that point?
A: Well they only thing they knew was
that we were flying back and we would come back on, at least try to come back,
on Sunday. So I don't know how many days it is in between, but I remember
clearly that we left them saying that it would be a Sunday. Of course they have
always had behind their mind that the army might come in.
Mark Davis: Daniel
Kogoya spent three hours talking with Sylvianne and Dr. Mayer on the morning of
the 9th. He was sure that the saga was about to end, that he and Silas could
talk Kwalik into releasing the hostages in three days' time when Sylvianne had
said she would return. Dr. Mayer still works for the ICRC and he will not
comment about the events of this day.
Map: Flight path between
Geselema and Keneyam at 11.20am.
Mark Davis: As
Sylvianne left Geselema to meet with Probowo and Fournier at Keneyam she
thought she was bringing good news, that there was still hope of a release.
There was no discussion about ending the mission. Sylvianne's account raises
serious doubts about the ICRC's version of events for the last three years. She
confirms that the OPM did not know that they were withdrawing on the 9th - and
neither did she.
Sylvianne Bonadei:
Q: So can we just make this absolutely
clear? Were you aware that the negotiations had ended on the, at midday on the
9th of May?
A: No, I was not aware. I remember
very clearly that we said that our next commitment with them was we would try
to go back there on the Sunday.
Mark Davis: So as
Henri and his team leave Keneyam and arrive in Timika at 1:30, it would seem
that the only people who do know what his plans are, are General Probowo and at
least some of his numerous white advisers.
Major-General Probowo:
God be with us.
Mark Davis: The
withdrawal of the International Red Cross without notice to the Papuans gave
Probowo a unique but narrow window of opportunity. The story of the ICRC's
departure was bound to be out and on the radio by the next day, then it would
be too late to send in a Trojan horse draped in a Red Cross flag. The scheme
had to occur that afternoon. As Probowo's choppers take off at around 2:30,
Henri Fournier and Dr. Mayer are getting ready to catch a plane to Jakarta.
Sylvianne still doesn't know that the mission is over.
Sylvianne Bonadei:
Q: So when Henri left on the afternoon
of the 9th he hadn't told you that the mission was over? As far as you were
concerned the mission was still continuing?
A: Yeah, for me, I still had in mind
that we had to try to get back there.
Henri Fournier:
Q: Are you trying, are you taking your
team back to Jakarta so that you're not around?
A: Well I mean that if, not really,
but I mean that if the military option had to be accepted by everybody, I was
not to be part of it anyway because it was not, I had no advice to give in this
kind of a situation.
Mark Davis: For three
years the International Red Cross have distanced themselves from the events of
the afternoon of the 9th. They claim that officially they were no longer
involved so it had nothing to do with them. And it certainly seems important to
Jean Michel Monod that his team had left the island as well.
Jean Michel Monod:
Q: What are your staff doing on the
afternoon of the 9th?
A: Well they were certainly not in a
helicopter as the rumour has it. Some were on their way back, or I suppose they
were all on their way back to Jakarta.
Q: They were all on their way back to
Jakarta?
A: Yeah.
Q: So, well who was that? Who was
going, on their way back to Jakarta at the time? Sylvianne Bonadei wasn't going
back to Jakarta.
A: She was going back to Jakarta.
Q: No, she wasn't.
A: Yes, of course she was.
Q: Henri says she wasn't.
A: Henri says she wasn't? Why she,
what was she doing back in Timika?
Q: I don't know, I was hoping you
might tell me. That's, it is a mystery. What was she doing in Timika? She was
there for another two days.
A: Are you kidding me?
Q: No, ask Henri. Henri left at 3
o'clock and Dr. Mayer left at 3 o'clock on their flight to Jakarta, and
Sylvianne remained.
Mark Davis: As
Fournier and Dr. Mayer wait to catch their plane for Jakarta, a white
helicopter approaches Geselema with five military helicopters well behind it.
But the hostages are no longer in Geselema, nor are the OPM - they had moved
camp about a kilometre down the hill.
Daniel Start: On the
afternoon of the 9th Silas had came to camp and he was going on, you know,
"We'll get you out of here, we'll get you, we'll sort something out."
And it was while he was saying this and we'd all gathered around and we were
nodding enthusiastically, that we heard this helicopter coming across the
mountains. "Red Cross," we said, "Red Cross," you know. And
Silas looked around and, "OK, yeah, Red Cross."
Mark Davis: There
were only three or four OPM members in the village as the chopper approached.
The civilians included guests from across the mountain who'd been invited to
the ICRC feast in Geselema the day before. They had nothing to do with Kwalik,
the OPM or the hostages. For them the Red Cross helicopter was always a welcome
sight and they stepped forward eagerly to greet it.
Institute for Human Rights Investigator:
At three o'clock a white helicopter came with the Red Cross flag with white
skinned people on board. Then about one metre before landing they jumped and
fired in the squatting position.
Daniel Kogoya: Once they'd
jumped out we did not recognise them, only Sylvia, a lady. Straightaway she
said, "There is Daniel Yudas." Then she moved one step ahead. She
waved towards me and then squatted down facing me. And those Western people had
laid face down and the shooting continued.
Institute for Human Rights Investigator:
Daniel fired back, but missed.
Daniel Kogoya: Then I
shot at Sylvia. I don't know if she died, but my message was: "We've
looked after the hostages and were about to hand them over, so why did you use
violence?"
Daniel Start: And then
about five minutes later there was a crack like a tree falling, and then we
realised it was gunfire.
Institute for Human Rights Investigator:
The people were scattered everywhere. Five minutes later helicopters from the
Indonesian airforce came and started shooting and dropping bombs in Geselema.
Photo: Papuan woman.
Institute for Human Rights Investigator:
She was one of the wounded in the shooting in Geselema and an eye witness of
the shooting of her friend.
Mark Davis: The Human
Rights report confirms that at least eight civilians were killed on the 9th of
May in Geselema. Many more were wounded, and others are still missing,
suspected dead.
Photo: Papuan boy.
Institute for Human Rights Investigator:
This is one of the boys whose mother was shot in Geselema, and his sister was
taken away by the soldiers and disappeared.
Ivor Helberg: What I
can say to you is that the SAS were not used in this operation.
Mark Davis: Helberg
adds that no other British troops were used either and that he was out of the
province at the time of the attack. And yet when Britain has been so intimately
and publicly associated with the lead up to that day, why have they displayed
virtually no interest in discovering what really occurred? What did their
surveillance an monitoring equipment reveal on the 9th? And why not use that
information to redeem Britain's reputation, in West Papua if nowhere else? Do
their tapes identify who opened fire on the civilians of Geselema? Do they
reveal the identity of the white helicopter? The witnesses identify the
helicopter as a Bell 412 or 212, white with markings. This matches some of the
helicopters that had been provided by Freeport through it's contractor Airfast
to the International Red Cross during the negotiations. In fact they are the
only helicopters that are permanently based in the region that match the
descriptions. Airfast and Freeport deny that any of their helicopters, whether
owned or chartered, were used in the attack. Airfast opens its logs to indicate
that their craft were not being used on the afternoon of the 9th, but there are
still some oddities.
Airfast Representative:
Q: So on the 9th, what's it doing
flying 12 people, have you got any recollection?
A: Wouldn't have a clue.
Mark Davis: There are
several flights during the relevant period which indicate that the military did
use Airfast Bell 412s or 212s. On the mornings of the 8th and the 9th there are
also two flights of unknown purpose which had 12 people and 100 kilos of load
hovering in the valleys immediately next to Geselema. Is it possible that they
are 12 soldiers carrying weapons and ammunition?
Ivor Helberg: You know
the helicopters as far as I'm concerned we used were military helicopters. Yes,
there was a white helicopter which actually belonged to Freeport that was used
which was sculling around, but as far as I'm aware, as far as I'm concerned,
you know, the Red Cross was taken off the minute the Red Cross went out of the
country.
Mark Davis: Did the
International Red Cross make any inquiries whatsoever into the movements of the
helicopters that had been booked in their name? And why such a languid response
by the ICRC to one of the most serious abuses of its symbol imaginable? It
seems implausible for either the ICRC or the British to plead ignorance on
these matters.
Photo: Front of Daniel
Start's book, The Open Cage: The Ordeal of the Irian Jaya Hostages.
Mark Davis: At the
very least Daniel Start printed the essence of the story in his account of his
time as a hostage which was published two years ago. Daniel confirmed the scale
of the attack which he heard but didn't see. But many of the local people who
were fleeing with him for the next six days did see it and spoke about it.
Daniel Start: And
suddenly we were terrified, because up until now the white people were the good
guys.
Mark Davis: The
events of May 9 were some of the briefest accounts in his book and he says the
hardest to write.
Daniel Start:
Q: Have you been told not to talk
about what you know about the situation?
A: We were certainly told that
operations like this have to be carried out in secrecy and it's important that
the details are not known because if they are they jeopardise future
operations. That's what we were told. And it was, you know, a gentleman's
agreement that whatever we might have picked up while we were in the forest
shouldn't really be talked about.
Photo: Front of Daniel
Start's book, The Open Cage: The Ordeal of the Irian Jaya Hostages.
Mark Davis: There is
a certain coyness in some of the passages, but the message was clear enough:
"Was
it possible that white people, British people, perhaps, had been a part of that
first attack? Was it possible that they had commandeered an Airfast helicopter
and pretended to be the Red Cross?"
Open questions that
were never answered, suspicions broadly held across West Papua that have never
been dispelled.
Henri Fournier: Look, I cannot remember it exactly, but I can tell you that
this story of white helicopter came to my knowledge most probably to say the
least, two months afterwards. I mean I never receive any information just, such
as the one you are telling me now, until I received the visit of somebody from
Irian who talked to me about it.
Q:
You must have known this within days, I mean the hostages were talking about
this?
A:
I don't recall that and I, I'm, I don't recall having, you know, first of all
we didn't, I don't recall having been told by the hostages about it.
Daniel Start: There was no point in us telling the British officials what
we knew - they knew. They knew perfectly, much better, what had happened. We
talked to the Red Cross about it because it had a direct, direct implications
for whether they could work in the area safely again.
Sylvianne Bonadei: For me, my first information that something strange
happened was when I met Mark on the day of the, when the hostages arrived in
Timika where Mark in tears just told me, "Why that white helicopter?"
And I just was so stunned and I said, "What are you talking about?"
And he couldn't say anything, he just said, "But why that white
helicopter?" I kept telling them, "No, I mean, I wasn't there, it wasn't
me. I can't believe it. I mean, just trust me, I wasn't in there."
Institute for Human Rights
Investigator: If they
think they were not involved they should have been here to investigate and
convince us that. To fulfil their humanitarian mission they have to find out if
people have been killed.
Henri Fournier:
Q:
Was one of the reasons this was not investigated to maintain good relations
with the Indonesian military?
A:
Not really.
Q:
Would this have been a great embarrassment to the Indonesian military?
A:
Not at all, because I mean it will have been very easy for everybody not to
acknowledge it because there was nobody to bring evidence.
Q:
Well there's hundreds of people up there who are prepared to give evidence.
A:
Yeah, I know, but it's one side of the story.
Q:
Well who's the other side of the story, General Probowo?
Jean Michel Monod:
Q:
Well what investigations did you make regarding this event?
A:
Well of course we asked questions around. We asked questions to the Indonesian
military and we shared our concern with the two embassies, British and Dutch
embassy, and we never get any precise answer. I mean, the operation took place,
the hostages were released except for two Indonesian hostages who were killed,
and that was it.
Sylvianne Bonadei: I don't really know what has caused that kind of a closed
mouth and no will of inquire actually, because if the emblem has been violated
I think this is a very, you know, it was our only powerful means of getting
into the, that place and get the trust from these people, so how can they
possibly trust us again?
Papuans gathering food in jungle: Your faces will be in this camera. If you see some leaves
on the other side, just grab them.
Mother with baby: Oh, poor girl. You poor girl. Let Mama pick the cassava.
Mark Davis: If the Indonesian military learnt any lessons from the
attack on Geselema it was that no one would ever know what they did in these
hills, or that those that did know would never say. Silence has killed far more
people here than those who were gunned down in Geselema.
Papuan woman: In the war my husband and my sister-in-law were killed by
the army and they burned the houses. And now look, when I took my babies with
me they were very small and now they're getting big.
Mark Davis: A church report last year which managed to investigate just
one small part of these mountains concluded that dozens of people had been
raped and severely beaten, 16 killed and 120 died of starvation in the wake of
the hostage crisis.
Papuan youth: They hit me on the head and smashed my face. That is why
whenever I work hard the blood will come out of my mouth.
Mark Davis: No one has any real idea of the full impact of the military
operation across these mountains, partly because no one has ever asked.
Daniel Start: Nobody wants to stand up alone against the Indonesian
military because they won't be allowed to stay, and a lot of people feel it's,
you know, well either because they've got, you know, mining concessions there
or because they feel they've got other work that they need to do which is more
important, they've chosen to either ignore the information or to keep silent
about it. And for the Papuans, whatever they shout, cry or scream, nobody's
gunna listen, nobody can hear them.
Mark Davis: These people are truly on their own. In their eyes it's not
just Indonesians who want to see them dead. It's the Americans who want their
gold, the British or the Dutch who send soldiers after them, the UN who gave
away their land, and now they think the Red Cross has betrayed them as well.
Jean Michel Monod:
Q:
But what does that symbol, that Red Cross symbol, mean to you? What does it
signify?
A:
It's an emblem which is supposed to protect the wounded, the sick and those who
care for them.
Q:
And what do you think emblem means to the people of Irian Jaya now?
A:
Well if this story is really true, of course, this emblem is associated with
killings.
Mark Davis: These men and boys are being taught how to face machine
guns when they are armed with bows and arrows. The Ndugas, the Amungme and the
Danis - hunted and alone, they say that this year is the time that they'll make
their last stand.
Papuan youth: We are not the only ones talking on this matter. All the
black skins in this place are saying the same thing.
Mark Davis: There is little doubt that they are going to attack this
year, and there's little doubt they'll be slaughtered. But if the world hears
of it at all, it will be just another rumour from the jungle.
Papuans (singing): Before, I could walk free. Now I am confused. Where can I
go? Every path I take, all I find is suffering. When I feel hungry. When I
thirst for sweetness, it is too hard to find. We face a bitter path. It is the
pain of us.
