1. MANDATE
Following the broadcast of Blood on
the Cross, by Mark Davis, on
Australia's ABC network and the Swiss French-language network TSR, the
International Committee of the Red Cross announced publicly that it would
appoint an individual outside the organization to draw up a report as to
the veracity of the allegations made in the documentary and any
responsibility on the part of the delegates involved in its activities in
Western Papua. The ICRC appointed Mr Piotr Obuchowicz, who is very
familiar with the organization and the way it works.
Australia's ABC network and the Swiss French-language network TSR, the
International Committee of the Red Cross announced publicly that it would
appoint an individual outside the organization to draw up a report as to
the veracity of the allegations made in the documentary and any
responsibility on the part of the delegates involved in its activities in
Western Papua. The ICRC appointed Mr Piotr Obuchowicz, who is very
familiar with the organization and the way it works.
Mark Davis largely based his
documentary on the findings of the report
drawn up by Irian Jaya's Institute for Policy and Human Rights Advocacy
("ELSHAM") and published in August 1999. The report asked the ICRC to look
into the events that occurred in Western Papua in May 1996.
drawn up by Irian Jaya's Institute for Policy and Human Rights Advocacy
("ELSHAM") and published in August 1999. The report asked the ICRC to look
into the events that occurred in Western Papua in May 1996.
Mr Obuchowicz began his
investigation on 25 October 1999. It required
travel to a number of places (including Jakarta and Western Papua itself)
and led him to meet directly and on the spot the various individuals
concerned and to analyse the allegations made against the ICRC.
travel to a number of places (including Jakarta and Western Papua itself)
and led him to meet directly and on the spot the various individuals
concerned and to analyse the allegations made against the ICRC.
Mr Obuchowicz spoke with many people
? including ICRC delegates ? who were
present in Indonesia in 1996, former hostages of Kelly Kwalik, armed forces
personnel, staff of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesian
human rights activists, ELSHAM representatives in Jayapura, representatives
of the Papuan Amungme et N'duga tribes, and both British and Netherlands
diplomats. The vast majority of the individuals approached co-operated with
the investigation. However, the Indonesian, British and Netherlands
authorities declined to take an official position on the matter. Nor was it
possible to meet Kelly Kwalik, General Prabowo Subianto, who had been
responsible for security operations in Western Papua at the time, or Mr
Ivor Helberg, the British military attaché who was present in Western Papua
during the hostage crisis.
present in Indonesia in 1996, former hostages of Kelly Kwalik, armed forces
personnel, staff of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesian
human rights activists, ELSHAM representatives in Jayapura, representatives
of the Papuan Amungme et N'duga tribes, and both British and Netherlands
diplomats. The vast majority of the individuals approached co-operated with
the investigation. However, the Indonesian, British and Netherlands
authorities declined to take an official position on the matter. Nor was it
possible to meet Kelly Kwalik, General Prabowo Subianto, who had been
responsible for security operations in Western Papua at the time, or Mr
Ivor Helberg, the British military attaché who was present in Western Papua
during the hostage crisis.
2. IS THERE ANY TRUTH TO THE
ALLEGATIONS ?
The investigation made it possible
to look into the facts of the case and
to assess the accounts gathered regarding the accusations levelled in the
ELSHAM report and the Davis documentary.
to assess the accounts gathered regarding the accusations levelled in the
ELSHAM report and the Davis documentary.
a) Did ICRC delegate Sylviane
Bonadei take part in the military operation
of 9 May 1996 ?
of 9 May 1996 ?
A detailed investigation into Ms
Bonadei's whereabouts on 9 May shows it to
be impossible that she could have been in Kenyam when the military
operation began. Moreover, the majority of witnesses and others involved in
the affair (including the makers of the documentary) who were questioned
stated that they had never believed that she had been present during the
operation. On the other hand, no one seemed to have difficulty in believing
that there had been a ruse, with a European posing as Ms Bonadei, to create
the illusion that an ICRC operation was underway.
be impossible that she could have been in Kenyam when the military
operation began. Moreover, the majority of witnesses and others involved in
the affair (including the makers of the documentary) who were questioned
stated that they had never believed that she had been present during the
operation. On the other hand, no one seemed to have difficulty in believing
that there had been a ruse, with a European posing as Ms Bonadei, to create
the illusion that an ICRC operation was underway.
b) Was the white helicopter the one
previously used by the ICRC, or
another?
another?
The investigation revealed that when
the military operation took place, at
least three white helicopters were operational in the region (one with
yellow markings, one with green and one with blue). It was not possible to
establish whether one of these had been used, especially as it is a simple
matter to quickly paint a military helicopter white. What is certain,
however, is that a white helicopter was employed for the military
operation.
least three white helicopters were operational in the region (one with
yellow markings, one with green and one with blue). It was not possible to
establish whether one of these had been used, especially as it is a simple
matter to quickly paint a military helicopter white. What is certain,
however, is that a white helicopter was employed for the military
operation.
c) Did the helicopter used for the
military operation bear the Red Cross
emblem?
emblem?
Accounts differ as to whether the
emblem was used. What is certain,
however, is that a white helicopter appeared in Ngesselema on the afternoon
in question and that it could have been perceived by the local population
only as an ICRC helicopter, whether displaying the red cross emblem or not.
Deceiving the local population in this manner could have had only one
effect in military terms: total surprise.
however, is that a white helicopter appeared in Ngesselema on the afternoon
in question and that it could have been perceived by the local population
only as an ICRC helicopter, whether displaying the red cross emblem or not.
Deceiving the local population in this manner could have had only one
effect in military terms: total surprise.
d) Who were the armed Westerners on
board the white helicopter?
Only a serious and transparent
investigation by the relevant government
authorities would enable a reliable reply to be made to this question.
There are three possibilities: members of the British special forces (who
some accounts indicate were present in the area); mercenaries from
Executive Outcomes or Sandline; or Indonesian personnel of European
extraction. It is nevertheless certain that Western advisers, including Mr
Ivor Helberg, helped the Indonesian armed forces prepare the operation.
authorities would enable a reliable reply to be made to this question.
There are three possibilities: members of the British special forces (who
some accounts indicate were present in the area); mercenaries from
Executive Outcomes or Sandline; or Indonesian personnel of European
extraction. It is nevertheless certain that Western advisers, including Mr
Ivor Helberg, helped the Indonesian armed forces prepare the operation.
e) Why did the ICRC announce that it
was terminating its involvement? Was
this fact conveyed to the hostage-takers?
this fact conveyed to the hostage-takers?
The role played by the ICRC during
the hostage crisis was in complete
accordance with the organization's policy in such situations. There were
two major aspects to that role:
accordance with the organization's policy in such situations. There were
two major aspects to that role:
1. material and moral support;
2. serving as a neutral intermediary.
2. serving as a neutral intermediary.
The ICRC fulfilled both aspects of
its role as long as it could, abandoning
the second on the morning of 9 May, though it indicated that it was
prepared to continue providing material and moral support. Thus, the ICRC
never took the decision to withdraw completely. However, owing to
insufficient communication within the ICRC team, but above all as a result
of security concerns (i.e. the hostage-takers' pronounced aggressiveness
towards the ICRC on the morning of 9 May), it was not possible for the
organization to explain to the hostage-takers in sufficient detail that it
was withdrawing certain services but not others. It should be noted that
the accounts of the hostages themselves and those of the delegates present
in Ngesselema on 9 May agree that the hostage-takers were by then expecting
imminent action by the Indonesian armed forces.
the second on the morning of 9 May, though it indicated that it was
prepared to continue providing material and moral support. Thus, the ICRC
never took the decision to withdraw completely. However, owing to
insufficient communication within the ICRC team, but above all as a result
of security concerns (i.e. the hostage-takers' pronounced aggressiveness
towards the ICRC on the morning of 9 May), it was not possible for the
organization to explain to the hostage-takers in sufficient detail that it
was withdrawing certain services but not others. It should be noted that
the accounts of the hostages themselves and those of the delegates present
in Ngesselema on 9 May agree that the hostage-takers were by then expecting
imminent action by the Indonesian armed forces.
f) How did the ICRC respond to the
allegations and how did it handle public
information in their wake?
information in their wake?
From the moment the first
accusations were voiced following the military
intervention, the ICRC kept a low profile and declined to respond to the
accusations (issuing neither confirmation nor denial). This was done in
order not to jeopardize the organization's other activities in the area.
Apart from a report on the events drawn up by the head of delegation and
received in Geneva two months after they had occurred, no detailed analysis
or thorough investigation was carried out. The approach taken by the ICRC's
Department of Operations is also open to question as it was limited to
asking the head of delegation to make informal inquiries of the Indonesian
authorities as to whether the allegations had any basis in reality. No
reply was received to those inquiries and no additional steps were
considered. Finally, the ICRC failed to defend staff members who were
publicly accused of collusion with the Indonesian armed forces.
Unfortunately, it was only after the publication of the ELSHAM report and
the broadcast of Mark Davis's documentary that the ICRC approached the
Indonesian authorities formally and in writing. No reply has thus far been
received.
intervention, the ICRC kept a low profile and declined to respond to the
accusations (issuing neither confirmation nor denial). This was done in
order not to jeopardize the organization's other activities in the area.
Apart from a report on the events drawn up by the head of delegation and
received in Geneva two months after they had occurred, no detailed analysis
or thorough investigation was carried out. The approach taken by the ICRC's
Department of Operations is also open to question as it was limited to
asking the head of delegation to make informal inquiries of the Indonesian
authorities as to whether the allegations had any basis in reality. No
reply was received to those inquiries and no additional steps were
considered. Finally, the ICRC failed to defend staff members who were
publicly accused of collusion with the Indonesian armed forces.
Unfortunately, it was only after the publication of the ELSHAM report and
the broadcast of Mark Davis's documentary that the ICRC approached the
Indonesian authorities formally and in writing. No reply has thus far been
received.
3. CONCLUSIONS
a) The information gathered in the
course of Mr Obuchowicz's investigation
enabled the ICRC to state categorically that Sylviane Bonadei did not take
part in the military operation carried out in Ngesselema on 9 May 1996 to
liberate the hostages held by the Free Papua Movement. For three years the
ICRC failed to unequivocally deny Ms Bonadei's involvement. The
organization owes it to her to take a clear position on the matter.
enabled the ICRC to state categorically that Sylviane Bonadei did not take
part in the military operation carried out in Ngesselema on 9 May 1996 to
liberate the hostages held by the Free Papua Movement. For three years the
ICRC failed to unequivocally deny Ms Bonadei's involvement. The
organization owes it to her to take a clear position on the matter.
b) The ICRC withdrew from its role
as a neutral intermediary in accordance
with its established policy in such matters. Although the dangerous
circumstances in which it was taken are sufficient to explain this abrupt
decision, the head of delegation's handling of the situation failed to
ensure adequate internal communication and lacked consistency with regard
to its consequences.
with its established policy in such matters. Although the dangerous
circumstances in which it was taken are sufficient to explain this abrupt
decision, the head of delegation's handling of the situation failed to
ensure adequate internal communication and lacked consistency with regard
to its consequences.
c) There can be no doubt that the
military forces that took action on 9 May
1996 in Ngesselema made perfidious use of the ICRC's role in the affair
(i.e. the white helicopter). They may also have misused the emblem, though
this has not been definitely proved.
1996 in Ngesselema made perfidious use of the ICRC's role in the affair
(i.e. the white helicopter). They may also have misused the emblem, though
this has not been definitely proved.
d) The ICRC was tardy in approaching
the Indonesian authorities and made no
attempt to approach the Papuan representatives with a view to verifying the
allegations. Steps must be taken to restore dialogue with the Papuans.
attempt to approach the Papuan representatives with a view to verifying the
allegations. Steps must be taken to restore dialogue with the Papuans.
e) The ICRC was not sufficiently
assiduous in following up the affair, in
dealing with its staff and, in particular, in handling its relationship
with the media.
dealing with its staff and, in particular, in handling its relationship
with the media.
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REFERENCE : Paul
Barber
TAPOL,
the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25
Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax:
1420 80153
Email:
plovers@gn.apc.org
Defending
victims of oppression in Indonesia,
East
Timor, West Papua and Aceh, 1973-1999
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